About 45,000 people travelled to the UN climate summit in Copenhagen - the vast majority conceived of the need for a few global agreements on climate change. So why did the summit end without one? Key governments do not want a global deal: Until the end of the summit, it appeared that all governments wanted to keep the keys to combating climate change within the UN climate convention.

In Copenhagen everyone talked, but no one really listened. The end of the meeting saw US and BASIC countries hammering out the last minute deal, neglecting others. The chief Danish negotiator Thomas Beker was sacked just weeks before the summit. This destroyed the atmosphere of trust that developing country negotiators had established with Mr Becker. The strategy of the major developing nations provided a reprieve from the danger of the breakdown of global negotiations. But their compromise highlights the dilemma of engaging the United States without allowing it to dictate the global climate agenda.

It is evident that the Copenhagen climate summit has failed to produce an equitable and viable plan to combat global warming that responds to both scientific and moral imperative. Undoubtedly, the success of the United States in forcing the Copenhagen Accord on to the agenda, with the active collusion of several developed countries, constitutes a serious threat to equitable and transparent global environment governance under United Nations' auspices.

Following the personal intervention of President Obama with select leaders, the drafting of the accord, drawn up in a series of closed-door meetings with select participants setting aside the outcomes of earlier negotiations, completely ignored the norms of equality of all nations and transparency that are at the core of the UN process. Nevertheless one of the Copenhagen's most valuable outcomes has been the guarantee of the continuity of UNFCCC negotiations, which will now continue at least for another year, despite the Copenhagen Accord.

The developing countries have thus managed to ensure that the primary agenda of the developed countries in the run-up to Copenhagen, that sought to dilute or erase the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities", has been pushed back to some measure. The attempts to set aside or replace the Kyoto Protocol and alter significantly the terms of the UNFCCC have not succeeded at the formal level, though the Copenhagen Accord itself is likely to be used for fresh attempts in this direction.

Developed nations are only expected to voluntarily declare their emission reduction commitments by 31st January,2010. But the domestic legislative process of the United States may not allow it to make any significant commitment to the emissions reduction at all. The climate science demands more emissions cuts from developed nations to match with scientific truth, whereas the oil and coal lobbies of US refuse to comply with it.

On the other hand, the developing countries have conceded that all their mitigation action will be subject to international consultation and analysis, under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected. Despite the strident criticism of sections of climate change activists, it is clear that the BASIC Four (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) had little room for manoeuvre at Copenhagen. In retrospect, the only way they could have evaded high-level political negotiations, would have been to reject at the outset itself, the leader-driven process promoted by the Danish Prime Minister on behalf of the US.

But faced with the climate negotiations, and unwilling to risk being held responsible for pre-determining the summit's failure, the four major developing nations, to varying degrees, were clearly willing to explore the Danish proposals. The BASIC Four demonstrated that they recognise their special responsibilities while deflecting potential criticism of standing in the way of drawing United States into global climate action. The summit also exposed the weakness inherent in the developing nations' strategy in uniting BASIC Four with G-77 in climate negotiations. The US, on the other hand, successfully used justified concerns regarding the emissions of the major developing economies, to impose mitigation demands on the entire developed world. Looking beyond Copenhagen, one can anticipate an even thornier path for future negotiations due to short-sighted and parochial domestic problems of the US.